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CONTRACTS-WARRANTIES, UNCONSCIONABILITY,
AND THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE-INDUSTRALEASE
AUTOMATED & SCIENTIFIC CORP. v. R.M.E.
ENTERPRISES, INC.
Defendant Max Evans,' the sole owner of a forty acre picnic grove
in Warren, New Jersey, was interested in disposing of the grove's garbage by incineration and contacted Glean Air, Inc., a manufacturer of
incinerators. On February 24, 1971, Clean Air and R.M.E. Enterprises (the corporate title of Evans' grove) entered into a lease for
two incinerators. This lease preserved for Enterprises the implied
warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose. 2
On May 13, 1971, with the picnic season at hand,3 representatives
of Clean Air and plaintiff Industralease Automated & Scientific Equip4
ment Corporation visited Evans and presented him with a new lease
that he described as being "like the other papers I signed but with a
different company's name on the top." 5 The name at the top was that
of the new lessor, Industralease. Evans was told that the first lease was
"no good," and that he would have to sign the new lease in order to
receive the incinerators. 6 Evans signed, though he did not notice that
1. Both Max Evans and R.M.E. Enterprises were defendants.
2. The lease included the following, in bold print:

9. Lessor makes no warranties with respect to the fitness or suitability of
the Leased Property for any purpose or use or with respect to its durability.
Lessee acknowledges that the Leased Property is of a size, design and capacity
selected by Lessee as suitable for its purposes. Lessor makes no warranties
expressed or implied, with respect to the Leased Property other than that, if
new, the standard manufacturer's warranty of new equipment is in effect and
lessor will exercise its rights thereunder for the mutual benefit of Lessor and
Lessee (or if Lessor be the manufacturer, it will comply with the terms and
conditions of its warranty).
Industralease Automated & Scientific Equip. Corp. v. R.M.E. Enterprises, Inc., 58
A.D.2d 482, 483 n.1, 396 N.Y.S.2d 427, 428 n.1 (2d Dep't 1977) (emphasis added).
The appellate division did not determine whether "the standard manufacturer's warranty of new equipment" gave rise to express or implied warranties; the court simply
said that "[Als Clean Air was manufacturer of the leased equipment, under the language
of the lease the usual warranties were ... in force." Id. at 483-84, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 428.
3. See id. at 489-90, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 432.
4. "[D]efendants were told that the contract in existence between themselves and
Clean Air could not be performed for not clearly communicated reasons . . . ." Id.
at 489, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 432. Apparently, at the time of performance, Clean Air could
not afford to lease the incinerators. See Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 4; telephone
call by author to Samuel W. Gilman, attorney for Enterprises, on February 9, 1978.
5. Industralease Automated & Scientific Equip. Corp. v. R.M.E. Enterprises, Inc.,
58 A.D.2d 482, 484, 396 N.Y.S.2d 427, 428 (2d Dep't 1977).
6. Id.
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the lease contained an unqualified disclaimer of express and implied
warranties and, in addition, a merger clause.8
Despite the efforts of Clean Air and Industralease, the incinerators would not incinerate. Evans demanded that they be removed, and
when Industralease refused, stopped Enterprises' payments. Industralease brought an action for the balance of the contract price. Enterprises counterclaimed for damages incurred in connection with the installation of the equipment.
At Trial Term, Justice XVidlitz found as a matter of law that the
disclaimer of warranties by Industralease was not unconscionable,0 but
submitted to the jury the question of whether express warranties,
which cannot be disclaimed, had been created, and if so, whether they
had been breached. 10 The jury found for Enterprises, and awarded
7. The provision included the following, in bold print:
2.c. (12) Representations. And Lessee does hereby agree that each unit is
of a size, design, capacity, and material selected by Lessee, and that Lessee is
satisfied that each such unit is suitable for Lessee's purposes, and sufficiently
durable under the conditions of usage thereof by Lessee, and that Lessor has
made no representations or warranties with respect to the suitability or durability of any unit for the purposes or uses of Lessee, or with respect to the
permissible load thereof, or any other representation or warranty, express or
implied, with respect thereto.
Id. at 484 n.2, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 428 n.2. The court noted that the disclaimer was conspicuous. Id. at 487, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 430.
8. "This agreement contains the entire understanding between lessor and lessee,
and any change or modification must be in writing and signed by both parties." Brief
for Plaintiff-Appellant at 16 (quoting Record at 17 a). The Second Department never
mentioned the presence of a merger clause in the contract. Thus, it is unclear whether
the merger clause was conspicuous.
9. Unconscionability is always a question of law for the court to decide. Industralease Automated & Scientific Equip. Corp. v. R.M.E. Enterprises, Inc., 58 A.D.2d 482,
488, 396 N.Y.S.2d 427, 431 (2d Dep't 1977) (citing Zicari v. Joseph Harris Co., 33
A.D.2d 17, 24, 304 N.Y.S.2d 918, 925 (1969)); N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-302(1) (McKinney
1964); N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-302, Official Comment 1 (MoKinney 1964). See Brooklyn
'Union Gas v. Jimeniz, 82 Misc. 2d 948, 950, 371 N.Y.S.2d 289, 290-91 (Civ. Ct.

1975); In re Vought, 70 Misc. 2d 781, 788-89, 334 N.Y.S.2d 720, 729 (Sur. Ct.
1972), aff'd, 45 A.D.2d 991, 360 N.Y.S.2d 199 (1974).
10. The source of the express warranties is not clear from the court's opinion. The
appellate division did not discuss how the express warranties were created, but simply
relied on the jury finding of their existence. Industralease Automated & Scientific Equip.
Corp. v. R.M.E. Enterprises, Inc., 58 A.D.2d 482, 487-88, 396 N.Y.S.2d 427, 430-31
(2d Dep't 1977). Judging by the content of the Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, see, e.g.,
id. at 8, 11, the express warranties were created by oral representations. Oral representations may give rise to express warranties, if the oral statements become "part of
the basis of the bargain." N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-313(1) (McKinney 1964).
On appeal, Industralease responded to the jury finding of express warranties
with the following arguments: first, "no admissible testimony was provided with respect to any expressed representations or warranties made by Clean Air . . . ." Brief
for Plaintiff-Appellant at 10-11; and second, without an agency relationship between
Clean Air and Industralease, any oral representations made by the former may not
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damages of $1,342.76. On appeal by Industralease, the Appellate Division, Second Department, affirmed on other grounds: the disclaimer
was unconscionable and therefore not enforceable." Industralease
Automated & Scientific Corp. v. R.M.E. Enterprises, Inc., 58 A.D.2d
482, 396 N.Y.S.2d 427 (2d Dep't 1977).
Justice Hopkins, writing for the Second Department, applied the
provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code to the writing, thus following the trend of extending the application of the Code.' 2 His reabind the latter, id. at 10-13, 19-20. It will be assumed, therefore, that the express warranties the jury found were created by oral representations.
The Defendants-Respondents' Brief contained no allegations of oral representa-

tions. Instead, Enterprises argued that the very use of the word "incinerators" in the
lease, as a description of the goods, gave rise to an express warranty. Since defendant
never received "incinerators," but only useless hulks of steel, the argument goes, there
was a breach of the express warranty. See generally Spanogle, Analyzing Unconscionability Problems, 117 U. PA. L. Rav. 931, 956-57 (1969). The lack of response to
plaintiff's arguments suggests that Enterprises was willing to concede the nonexistence
of the oral express warranties. The Second Department never resolved this apparent
dispute.
11. The issues of revocation of acceptance and failure of consideration were not
raised by the parties. Industralease Automated & Scientific Equip. Corp. v. R.M.E.
Enterprises, Inc., 58 A.D.2d 482, 490 n.5, 396 N.Y.S.2d 427, 432 n.5 (2d Dep't 1977).
12. See generally Glenn Dick Equip. Co. v. Galey Constr., Inc., 97 Idaho 216,
220-28, 541 P.2d 1184, 1188-96 (1975); Annot., 48 A.L.R.3d 668 (1973); Murray,
Under the Spreading Analogy of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 39 FoDnA.M
L. Rv.447 (1971).
There are three rationales offered for the extension of the Uniform Commercial Code
beyond the sale of goods. First, some courts hold that a particular lease is within the ambit
of Article 2 because the lease is a transaction in goods under § 2-102. In re Vaillancourt,
7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 748 (D. Me. 1970); Owens v. Patent Scaffolding Co., 77 Misc.
2d 992, 354 N.Y.S.2d 778 (Sup. Ct. 1974), rev'd, 50 A.D.2d 866, 376 N.Y.S.2d 948
(1975). See United States Leasing Corp. v. Franklin Plaza Apts., Inc., 65 Misc. 2d
1082, 319 N.Y.S.2d 531 (Civ. Ct. 1971); Fairfield Lease Corp. v. George Umbrella
Co., 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 184 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1970); Hertz Commercial Leasing Corp.
v. Transportation Credit Clearing House, Inc., 59 Misc. 2d 226, 298 N.Y.S.2d 392
(Civ. Ct. 1969), rev'd on other grounds, 64 Misc. 2d 910, 316 N.Y.S.2d 585 (App. T.
1970). But see Computer Servicenters, Inc. v. Beacon Mfg. Co., 328 F. Supp. 653
(D.C.S.C. 1970) (U.C.C. provision on statute of frauds inapplicable to lease of
services, as lease not a "sale of goods"), aff'd, 443 F.2d 906 (4th Cir. 1971); Walter
E. Heller & Co. v. Convalescent Home, 49 Ill. App. 3d 213, 365 N.E.2d 1285 (1977);
Leasco Data Proc. Equip. Corp. v. Starline Overseas Corp., 74 Misc. 2d 898, 346
N.Y.S.2d 288 (App. T. 1973), aff'd mem., 45 A.D.2d 992, 360 N.Y.S.2d 199, motion
for leave to appeal denied mem., 35 N.Y.2d 963, 324 N.E.2d 557, 365 N.Y.S.2d 179
(1974).
Courts also analogize the specific lease in question to a sale of goods. ASCO
Mining Co. v. Gross Contracting Co., U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 293 (Pa. Ct. Com., Pleas
1965); United States Leasing Corp. v. Franklin Plaza Apts., 65 Misc. 2d 1082, 319
N.Y.S.2d 531 (Civ. Ct. 1971).
Finally, some courts adopt a piecemeal approach. Taking into account all relevant
economic and social factors, courts will determine whether it is appropriate to apply a
particular provision to the transaction. KPLR TV, Inc. v. Visual Elec. Corp., 465
F.2d 1382 (8th Cir. 1972); Sawyer v. Pioneer Leasing Corp., 244 Ark. 943, 428 S.W.2d
46 (1968); W. E. Johnson Equip. Co. v. United Airlines, Inc., 238 So. 2d 98 (Fla.
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soning, however, was confusing. Justice Hopkins seems to have interpreted section 2-102 as precluding the application of article 2 of
the Code when the writing includes the retention of a security interest.' 3 But, section 2-102 excludes from article 2 coverage those transactions intended solely as a security transaction. 14 The Official Comment to section 2-102 points out that article 2 is applicable to the
"general sale aspects of such transactions." Justice Hopkins then examined the "nature" of the contract between Enterprises and Industralease, and held it was not a security transaction or a lease, but rather
a sale. "[T]hough cast in form as a lease, [the transaction] assumed
the true model of a sale."' 5 The lease was merely a device employed
to finance the purchase.16
In sharp contrast to the conclusions of Justice Widlitz, Justice
Hopkins interpreted section 2-31617 as allowing the disclaimer of both
1970); Glenn Dick Equip. Co. v. Galey Constr., Inc., 97 Idaho 216, 541 P.2d 1184
(1975); All-States Leasing Co. v. Bass, 96 Idaho 873, 538 P.2d 1177 (1975); Walter
E. Heller & Co. v. Convalescent Home, 49 Ili. App. 3d 213, 365 N.E.2d 1285 (1977);
Owens v. Patent Scaffolding Co., 50 A.D.2d 866, 376 N.Y.S.2d 948 (1975). See also
Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing, 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769 (1965); Baker v. City
of Seattle, 79 Wash. 2d 198, 484 P.2d 405 (1971).
13. N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-102 (McKinney 1964) states in part: "Unless the context
otherwise requires this Article applies to transactions in goods; it does not apply to any
transactions which although in the form of an unconditional contract to sell or present
sale is intended to operate only as a security transaction. .. "
14. R. ANDERSON, ANDERSON ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, § 2-102:3
at 207-08 (2d ed. 1970).
15. 58 A.D.2d at 487, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 430. When an interest in property is retained, the contract may be called either a security transaction or a lease. See N.Y.
U.C.C. § 1-201(37) (McKinney 1964). See generally J. WHITE & R. SuiMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMM ERCIAL CODE, § 22-3 (1970). Neither
characterization, however, precludes the application of Article 2: if a lease, Artile 2
may be applied under the rationales suggested in note 12 supra;if a security transaction,
Article 2 is applicable to the underlying sales aspects of the transaction, R. ANDERSON,
supra note 14, § 102:3 at 207-08. The court was therefore incorrect in finding the
contract to be neither a security transaction nor a lease; further, it was unnecessary for
the court to determine whether the contract was a lease or a sale.
16. "The lease was one in name only . . . ." 58 A.D.2d at 487, 396 N.Y.S.2d at
430. The lease provided for 60 monthly rental payments of $319.70, plus sales tax
with an option to purchase the equipment for $1,390 at the lease's expiration. Id. at
484, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 428.
17. N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-316 (McKinney 1964) states:
(1) Words or conduct relevant to the creation of an express warranty
and words or conduct tending to negate or limit warranty shall be construed
wherever reasonable as consistent with each other; but subject to the provisions of this Article on parol or extrinsic evidence (Section 2-202) negation
or limitation is inoperative to the extent that such construction is unreasonable.
(2) Subject to subsection (3), to exclude or modify the implied warranty of merchantability or any part of it the language must mention
merchantability and in case of a writing must be conspicuous, and to exclude
or modify any implied warranty of fitness the exclusion must be by a writing
and conspicuous. Language to exclude all implied warranties of fitness is
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express and implied warranties. 18 He held that because the questions
submitted to the jury conflicted "with the language of the disclaimer,
which excluded reliance by the defendant on any such warranties,"' 19
the decision of Trial Term would have to be reversed, unless, of
course, the disclaimer was unconscionable.
Express warranties can never be disclaimed;20 discussion of their
sufficient if it states, for example, that "There are no warranties which extend
beyond the description on the face hereof."
(3) Notwithstanding subsection (2)
(a) unless the circumstances indicate otherwise, all implied warranties are excluded by expressions like "as is", "with all
faults" or other language which in common understanding
calls the buyer's attention to the exclusion of warranties and
makes plain that there is no implied warranty; and
(b) when the buyer before entering into the contract has examined the goods or the sample or model as fully as he desired
or has refused to examine the goods there is no implied warranty with regard to defects which an examination ought in
the circumstances to have revealed to him; and
(c) an implied warranty can also be excluded or modified by
course of dealing or course of performance or usage of trade.
18. See 58 A.D.2d at 488, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 430-31.
19. Id. at 488, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 430. Two inferences of questionable validity can
be drawn from this statement. The first is that if a contract contains a written express
warranty and a disclaimer of express warranties, the latter will control. In view of
§ 2-316(1), that inference is clearly mistaken. See note 20 infra. A perhaps more
difficult situation arises when there is a conflict between a disclaimer of express warranties and an oral express warranty. Under § 2-313 express waranties may be
created orally. Notwithstanding the parol evidence rule, there should be no difference
in result, since § 2-316(1) does not distinguish between modes of creating express warranties. Parol evidence will affect the result, of course, but Justice Hopkins
did not indicate that he had the parol evidence rule in mind when he made the quoted
statement.
The second principle suggested by Justice Hopkins' statement is that reliance by
the buyer is necessary to validate an express warranty. This is in conflict with the
Official Comments to section 2-313: "affirmations of fact made by the seller about the
goods during a bargain are regarded as part of the description of those goods; hence
no particular reliance on such statements need be shown . . . :' N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-313,
Official Comment 3 (McKinney 1964). See, e.g., Klein v. Asgrow Seed Co., 246 Cal.
App. 2d 87, 102 n.8, 54 Cal. Rptr. 609, 619 n.8 (1966) (dicta); Interco, Inc. v. Randustrial Corp., 533 S.W.2d 257 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976). But see, e.g., Hrosik v. J. Kein
Builders, 37 Ill. App. 3d 352, 345 N.E.2d 514 (1976). See also Weintraub, Disclaimer
of Warranties and Limitation of Damages for Breach of Warranty Under the UCC, 53
Tax. L. Rav. 60 (1974).
20. Subdivision 1 of § 2-316 provides that if there is a conflict between an express
warranty and a disclaimer of express warranties, and the clauses cannot reasonably be
construed to be consistent with one another, the disclaimer is ineffective and the warranty survives. See Berk v. Gordon Johnson Co., 232 F. Supp. 682 (D.C. Mich. 1964);
Young & Cooper, Inc. v. Vestring, 214 Kansas 311, 327, 521 P.2d 281, 293 (1974);
Chisolm v. J.R. Simplot, 94 Idaho 628, 631 n.4, 495 P.2d 1113, 1116 n.4 (1972);
Wilson Trading Corp. v. David Ferguson, Ltd., 23 N.Y.2d 398, 244 N.E.2d 685, 297
N.Y.S.2d 108 (1968); Bowen v. Young, 507 S.W.2d 600 (Tex. Ct. App. 1974);
Mobile Housing, Inc. v. Stone, 490 S.W.2d 611 (Tex. Ct. App. 1973); Annot, 17
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unconscionability by the court, therefore, was mistaken. Implied warranties, on the other hand, may be disclaimed, and the court here
focused on whether in the commercial relationship between Industralease and Enterprises the disclaimer was unconscionable within the
meaning of section 2-302.21
A.L.R.3d 1010, § 25(a) at 1073 (1968); Duesenberg, The Manufacturer'sLast Stand:
The Disclaimer, 20 Bus. LAw. 159, 162-65 (1964). Cf. Ford Motor Co. v. Reid, 250
Ark. 176, 465 S.W.2d 80 (1971) (under § 2-316(1), provision in contract for new
car tending to limit remedies for breach of express warranty should be read so as to
be consistent with express warranty; court interpreted provision to be merely an instruction to dealer from manufacturer). That express warranties may not be disclaimed
is in line with the policy underlying § 2-316. See N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-316, Official Comment 1 (McKinney 1964) ("[Section 2-316] seeks to protect a buyer from unexpected
and unbargained language of disclaimer by denying effect to such language when
inconsistent with language of express warranty ... ."). Parol warranties are, however,
subject to § 2-202-the parol evidence rule. See notes 39-43 & accompaning text infra.
Other courts in New York have mistakenly suggested that express warranties can
be disclaimed. In Stryker v. Rusch, 8 A.D.2d 244, 187 N.Y.S.2d 663 (1959), a preCode case, the court decided correctly that where there was a complete exclusion of
express warranties in a written contract, the parol evidence rule precluded
evidence of prior oral agreements. No reference was made to disclaimers. In Rugenstein v. Frosty Teddy Corp., 29 A.D.2d 624, 285 N.Y.S.2d 403 (1967) (mem.), however, the Fourth Department dismissed the plaintiff-purchaser's cause of action based
on breach of express warranty because of the presence of a disclaimer in the contract.
A similar error can be found in Pennsylvania Gas Co. v. Secord Bros., 73 Misc. 2d
1031, 343 N.Y.S.2d 256 (Sup. Ct. 1973), aff'd, 44 A.D.2d 906, 357 N.Y.S.2d 702
(1974). There the plaintiff-seller sought recovery on the balance of the purchase price
for certain heating and air conditioning units sold to the defendant. The buyer sought
to avoid payment through a breach of warranty argument, having allegedly relied on
written promotional material and oral representations. The court interpreted the Official
Comments to §§ 2-313 and 2-316 of the U.C.C. to permit the disclaimer of express
warranties: "a construction of survival of express warranty is to be preferred over construction giving effect to the provisions of disclaimer of express warranty. However, the
...
suggested preferential treatment is not absolute." 73 Misc. 2d at 1037, 343 N.Y.S.2d
at 263. The court added that "a disclaimer of express warranties . . . [is] unquestionably valid subject matter of a contract . .

. ."

Id. at 1036, 343 N.Y.S.2d at 263. In

finding for the seller, the court held that the merger clause in the written agreement
rendered inadmissible any parol evidence. See Walsh v. Ford Motor Co., 59 Misc. 2d
241, 298 N.Y.S.2d 538 (Sup. Ct. 1969); Will Laboratories, Inc. v. White Rock Corp.,
4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 848 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1967); Belvision, Inc. v. General Elec. Co.,
46 Misc. 2d 952, 260 N.Y.S.2d 579 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
21. N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-302 (McKinney 1964), the Code's major provision on unconscionability, states:
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of
the contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court
may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the
contract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application
of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.
(2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or any
clause thereof may be unconscionable the parties shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present evidence as to its commercial setting, purpose and
effect to aid the court in making the determination.
For material supporting the application of § 2-302 to disclaimers that otherwise
satisfy § 2-316, see Fairfield Lease Corp. v. Colonial Aluminum Sales, Inc., 3 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. 858 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966); Jefferson Credit Corp. v. Marcano, 60 Misc. 2d
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Justice Hopkins initiated his analysis by reference to the test articulated in the landmark case of Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co. 2 2 The test comprises "'an absence of meaningful choice on
the part of one of the parties together with contract terms which are
unreasonably favorable to the other party,' and characterized 'by a
gross inequality of bargaining power'. . . .. '3 Justice Hopkins distinguished procedural and substantive unconscionability, 24 and concluded
that both were present in the instant case.2 5
138, 302 N.Y.S.2d 390 (Civ. Ct. 1969); Willman v. American Motor Sales Co., 44
Erie Co. Leg. J. 51 (Erie Co. Ct. Pa. 1961); Ellinghaus, In Defense of Unconsconability, 78 YALE L.J. 757, 793-803 (1969); Murray, Unconscionability: Unconscionability, 31 U. Prr. L. Rav. 1, 45 (1969); Spanogle, supra note 10, at 957-58 (1969).
For sources asserting that § 2-302 is inapplicable to a disclaimer that satisfies the requirements of § 2-316, see Avery v. Aladdin Prods. Div., Nat'l Serv. Indus., Inc., 128

Ga. App. 266, 196 S.E.2d 357 (1973); 1 H.

HAvKLAND,

A

TRANSACTIONAL GuIDE TO

84, 85 (1964); Leff, Unconscionability and the
Code-The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. Rav. 485, 523 (1967). Cf. Arrow
Transp. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 289 F. Supp. 170 (D.C. Ore. 1968) (language of disclaimer not unconscionable); Sutter v. St. Clair Motors, Inc., 44 Ill. App. 2d 318,
323-24, 194 N.E.2d 674, 677 (1963) (in dicta, court found it unconscionable to give
effect to hidden disclaimer); Monsanto Co. v. Alden Leeds, Inc., 130 N.J. Super. 245,
326 A.2d 90 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1974) (clause allocating risk of property damage
may be unconscionable).
On the related issue of whether a limitation of remedies or of consequential damages
is unconscionable, the courts have held almost unanimously that any limitation on damages
compensating personal injuries is unconscionable. E.g., Matthews v. Ford Motor Co.,
479 F.2d 399 (4th Cir. 1973); Ford Motor Co. v. Tritt, 244 Ark. 883, 889, 430
S.W.2d 778, 781-82, diff, result reached on reh. on other grounds, 244 Ark. 890A, 430
S.W.2d 782 (1968) ; Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960) ;
Velez v. Craine & Clark Lbr. Corp., 33 N.Y.2d 117, 305 N.E.2d 750, 350 N.Y.S.2d
617 (1973) (dicta); Sarfati v. M.A. Hittner & Sons, Inc., 35 A.D.2d 1004, 318
N.Y.S.2d 352 (1970), appeal dismissed mem., 28 N.Y.2d 808, 270 N.E.2d 729, 32 N.Y.S.
2d 912 (1971), aff'd mem., 30 N.Y.2d 613, 282 N.E.2d 126, 331 N.Y.S.2d 40 (1973);
Walsh v. Ford Motor Co., 59 Misc. 2d 241, 298 N.Y.S.2d 538 (Sup. Ct. 1969). Cf.
Baker v. City of Seattle, 79 Wash. 2d 198, 484 P.2d 405 (1971) (complete and inconspicuous disclaimer that served to nullify lessor's liability for lessee's personal injuries unconscionable). But see Ford Motor Co. v. Moulton, 511 S.W.2d 690 (Tenn.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 870 (1974).
22. 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965). Though the Uniform Commercial Code was
held not directly applicable to the contract in Walker-Thomas, the court derived support
from § 2-302, and found it to be a restatement of the common law. Id. at 448-49.
23. 58 A.D.2d at 489, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 431 (quoting Williams v. Walker-Thomas
Furn. Co., 350 F.2d at 449).
24.
Procedural unconscionability in general is involved with the contract
formation process, and focuses on high pressures exerted on the parties, fine
print of the contract, misrepresentation, or unequal bargaining position.
Substantive unconscionability, on the other hand, is involved with the content
of the terms of the contract per se, such as inflated prices ....
58 A.D.2d at 489 n.4, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 431 n.4.
25. Id. at 489, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 431. Rarely has the presence of either procedural
or substantive unconscionability alone been sufficient to support a finding of unconscionability. Spanogle, supra note 10, at 948-52, 955-56, 968-69. One court has specifically
required that both "must be particularized in some detail." Patterson v. Walker-Thomas
THE UNIFORM

COMMERCIAL

CODE
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The court's discussion strayed from the Walker-Thomas unconscionability standard, however. The Walker-Thomas test requires a
careful examination of the bargaining situation before finding procedural unconscionability, while Industralease found procedural unconscionability in a summary fashion, based solely on "[t]he atmosphere of haste and pressure on the defendants .... -12 The appellate
division failed to discuss fully the existence or nonexistence of an absence of meaningful choice or a gross inequality in bargaining power.
Findings of this kind are usually necessary in transactions between
businessmen where, unlike consumer transactions,2 7 there is a presumption that the parties have negotiated on an equal basis. 28 In discussing the gross inequality of bargaining power, the court referred to
the defendants' lack of expertise in buying incinerators; the possibility that the plaintiff was inexperienced in selling incinerators was
ignored.29 Furthermore, Max Evans might have been estopped from
Furn. Co., 277 A.2d 111, 114 (D.C. Ct. App. 1971). See Eddy, On the "Essential"
Purposes of Limited Remedies: The Metaphysics of UCC Section 2-719(2), 65 CAL.
L. Rav. 28, 41 n.56; Note, Contracts-Developing Concepts of Unconscionability, 80
W. VA. L. Rnv. 87, 90, 104, 111-12 (1977) (asserting that courts should require the
presence of both components).
26. 58 A.D.2d at 489, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 432. The court suggested three facts to
support its statement. First, the court referred to the switch in lessors, "for not clearly
communicated reasons . . . ." Id.; see note 4 supra. Second, "with the beginning of the
season . . . at hand, the defendants were clearly at a disadvantage to bargain further . . . ." 58 A.D.2d at 490, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 432. Finally, defendants had little expertise in dealing with the equipment. Id.
27. See, e.g., Morrow v. New Moon Homes, Inc., 548 P.2d 279, 292 n.43 (Alas.
1976) (dicta); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
28. As one court has stated, "[though a commercial setting does not necessarily
bar a claim of procedural unconscionability, 'it is the exceptional commercial setting
where a claim of unconscionabiity will be allowed . . . ."' Fleischmann Dist. Corp. v.
Distillers Co., 395 F. Supp. 221, 233 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (quoting County Asphalt, Inc. v.
Lewis Welding & Eng'r Corp., 323 F. Supp. 1300, 1308 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 444
F.2d 372 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 939 (1971)); see Walter E. Heller & Co.
v. Convalescent Home, 49 I1. App. 3d 213, 365 N.E.2d 1285 (1977); Bill Stremmel
Motors Inc. v. IDS Leasing Corp., 89 Nev. 414, 514 P.2d 654 (1973); Equitable
Lumber Corp. v. IPA Land Dev. Corp., 38 N.Y.2d 516, 523, 344 N.E.2d 391, 396, 381
N.Y.S.2d 459, 464 (1976); Fairfield Lease Corp. v. Umberto, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
1181 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1970) (in holding lease between commercial parties unconscionable, court examined relative bargaining position of assignor and assignee). Cf. Keystone
Aeronautics Corp. v. R. J. Enstrom Corp., 499 F.2d 146 (3d Cir. 1974) (Pennsylvania law
found to permit waiver of liability under § 402A Restatement of Torts 2d between business
entities of relatively equal bargaining power); Coulston v. Teliscope Prods., Ltd., 85
Misc. 2d 339, 378 N.Y.S.2d 553 (App. T. 1975) (implied warranty of habitability
not extended to commercial tenant). But see In re Elkins-Dell Mfg., 253 F. Supp. 864
(E.D. Pa. 1966); Electronics Corp. of America v. Lear Jet Corp., 55 Misc. 2d 1066,
286 N.Y.S.2d 711 (Sup. Ct. 1967); Schroeder v. Fageol Motors, Inc., 86 Wash. 2d 256,
544 P.2d 20 (1975).
29. Industralease "was not a merchant in goods of the sought [sic] leased" to
Enterprises. Supplemental Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 8.
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arguing such a gross inequality of bargaining power, since Evans, the
owner of a business grossing over one million dollars annually, neither
read the lease nor showed it to his attorney.O On the other hand, the
court might have justified a finding of procedural unconscionability
by questioning whether Evans, when presented with the new contract,
had any real choice other than to sign the contract. 31
Justice Hopkins also deviated from the Uniform Commercial
Code's test of substantive unconscionability. Section 2-302 of the Code
requires that a court determine "whether . . . the clauses involved

are so one-sided as to be unconscionable under the circumstances existing at the time of the making of the contract."13 2 Since the contract
term in question is the disclaimer of implied warranties, and since
section 2-316 of the Code specifically permits the seller to disclaim
implied warranties, it is difficult to see how this disclaimer in isolation
can be substantively unconscionable. 3 Instead of addressing the circumstances at the time the contract was created, Justice Hopkins fo30. In 1971, R.M.E. Enterprises had a gross income in seven figures. Although
Max Evans "had an attorney" in New Jersey, Evans did not consult counsel before
signing the lease. Telephone call by author to Samuel W. Gilman, attorney for Enterprises, on February 9, 1978. Evans did bring the papers home to obtain his wife's
signature. Reply Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 2. According to the testimony, however,
he failed to read them. Defendants-Respondents' Brief at 2.
31. The court found that "with the beginning of the season for the defendants'
operations at hand, the defendants were clearly at a disadvantage to bargain further . . ." 58 A.D.2d at 490, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 432. But, a disadvantaged bargaining
position alone is not enough to support a finding of unconscionability. See N.Y. U.C.C.
§ 2-302, Official Comment I (McKinney 1964) ("The principle is . . . not [one] of
disturbance of allocation of risks because of superior bargaining power."). It could be
argued, however, that when Evans was presented with the second contract, he had no
meaningful choice-he had already built concrete pads to accommodate the custom
made incinerators. Defendants-Respondents' Brief at 4. The combination of expense
and time pressure imposed by the rapidly approaching picnic season most likely precluded pursuit of an alternative response.
32. N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-302, Official Comment 1 (McKinney 1964) (emphasis
added). See Equitable Lumber Co. v. IPA Land Dev. Corp., 38 N.Y.2d 516, 523,
344 N.E.2d 391, 396, 381 N.Y.S.2d 459, 464 (1976); Division of Triple T Serv., Inc.
v. Mobil Oil Corp., 60 Misc. 2d 720, 730, 304 N.Y.S.2d 191, 201-02 (Sup. Ct. 1969);
Sinkoff Beverage Co. v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 51 Misc. 2d 446, 448, 273 N.Y.S.2d
364, 366-67 (Sup. Ct. 1966); In re Estate of Young, 81 Misc. 2d 920, 923, 367
N.Y.S.2d 717, 722 (Sur. Ct. 1975); Fairfield Lease Corp. v. Umberto, 7 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. 1181, 1184 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1970); N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-302, New York Annotations,
Historical Note (McKinney 1964).
33. This is not to suggest that a disclaimer of implied warranties can never be
held unconscionable. If a sliding scale is used, see Eddy, supra note 25, at 42 n.56
(discussing Spanogle, supri; note 10, at 968), a court could find the inclusion of a disclaimer in a contract unconscionable iV a strong showing of procedural unconscionability were demonstrated. Absent such a disparity in bargaining positions, however, it
would be difficult to justify a holding of unconscionability because of the presumptive
validity the Code gives to disclaimers that satisfy the requirements of § 2-316.
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cused on the end result: "[W]e cannot divorce entirely the events
which occur later .... In effect the equipment was worthless ....1,,4
This sort of reasoning, however, leads to unpredictable results. Parties
should have the right, especially in commercial situations, to allocate
the risks as they see fit. Absent gross inequities, the agreed upon allocation should be respected. The court's conclusion that the disclaimer
of implied warranties was unconscionable thus strayed from proper
use of that doctrine and is questionable.
A more traditional, predictable, and therefore more satisfying
analysis would have disclosed the presence of express warranties, and
why such warranties were not excluded by the parol evidence rule.",
Such an analysis would focus on whether the parties intended to discharge the previous agreement by executing the second contract.3 0
More precisely, primary consideration would have to be given to the
orally created express warranties and the reasons for their continued
existence.
Two theories would prevent the interposition of the parol evidence rule by Industralease. 37 First, section 2-202 requires that before parol testimony inconsistent with a term of the contract is excluded from evidence, the court must find that the parties intended
the writing to be a final statement of their agreement. Second, the
parol evidence rule could be avoided through reference to the common law doctrine of mistake. In this case, it is doubtful that the
parties intended the instant writing to be final, and even if it were,
plaintiff's apparent knowledge that Evans would be mistaken about
34. 58 A.D.2d at 490, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 432 (citing Vlases v. Montgomery Ward
& Co., 377 F.2d 846 (3d Cir. 1967)).

35. Section 2-302 was intended to allow the courts to police contracts explicitly,
rather than through the covert twisting of traditional contract law. N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-302,
Official Comment 1 (McKinney 1964); Fort, Understanding Unconscionability: Defining
the Principle, 9 Loy. CH. L.. 765, 767 (1978). There is nothing in the history of
§ 2-302 to indicate that unconscionability should be used to invalidate a contract when
a more traditional theory is appropriate.
36. See A. CORBIN, 3 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, § 582 at 455 (1960). What seems
to have been most unfair in Industralease was the violation of buyer's reasonable expectations through the substitution of the second contract for the first. Yet this alone is
insufficient to support a finding of unconscionability. The analysis suggested in text,
by exploring more closely the expectations of the parties, seeks to ascertain their intentions, and therefore the terms of the agreement.
37. The court found the disclaimer, not the parol evidence, to be a bar to Enterprises' recovery. As discussed above, this was incorrect; oral express warranties may not
be disclaimed, though they are subject to the parol evidence rule. See note 20 & accompanying text supra. If the court had framed the question as whether the parol warranties should be excluded by the parol evidence rule, it could have requested supplementary briefs on this issue, as it did on the issue of unconscionability.
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the terms of the contract would allow as evidence plaintiff's oral
representations.
As noted above, express warranties may not be disclaimed; 8s they
are subject, however, to the parol evidence rule.3 9 Section 2-202 provides that if the writing is intended to be the "complete and exclusive statement of the agreement," parol evidence will be excluded. 40
If the writing is intended to be the final but not exclusive expression
of an agreement, consistent4' additional terms that explain or supplement the terms of the final agreement may be introduced. 42 U1ifortunately, the Code neither defines nor provides a test for determining
whether a writing was intended to be final. It will be assumed here
that a writing is a final expression of the agreement if both parties
43
intended it to supersede all prior oral agreements.
38. See note 20 supra.
39. The parol evidence rule is codified in N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-202 (McKinney

1964):

Terms with respect to which the confirmatory memoranda of the parties
agree or which are otherwise set forth in a writing intended by the parties as a
final expression of their agreement with respect to such terms as are included
therein may not be contradicted by evidence of any prior agreement or of a
contemporaneous oral agreement but may be explained or supplemented
(a) by course of dealing or usage of trade (Section 1-205) or
by course of performance (Section 2-208); and
(b) by evidence of consistent additional terms unless the
court finds the writing to have been intended also as a
complete and exclusive statement of the 'terms of the
agreement.
For discussions on the interaction between oral express warranties and the parol
evidence rule, see Jordan v. Doonan Truck & Equip., Inc., 220 Kan. 431, 433-36, 552 P.2d
881, 883-84 (1976); R. DUESENBERG & L. KING, SALES & BULK TRANSFERS UNDER
U.C.C., § 6.06 (1977); Broude, The Consumer and the Parol Evidence Rule: Section
2-202 of the Uniform Code, 1970 DUKE L.J. 881. Whether § 2-202 should apply
at all to express warranties has been questioned. Donnelly & Donnelly, Commercial Law,
1977 Survey of New York Law, 29 SYRACUSE L. REv. 327, 337-38 (1978). Certainly
the parol evidence rule was intended to exclude "false allegations of oral warranties.... ." N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-316, Official Comment 2 (McKinney 1964).
40. N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-202(b) (McKinney 1964). This exclusionary effect is mitigated by paragraph (a) of § 2-202, which "makes admissible evidence of course of
dealing, usage of trade and course of performance to explain or supplement the terms
of any writing .

. . ."

N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-202, Official Comment 2 (McKinney 1964).

41. The meaning of "consistent" is unclear. It is not defined by the Code. New
York courts have formulated the test as follows: "To be inconsistent the term must
contradict or negate a term of the writing. A term or condition which has a lesser
effect is provable." Hunt Foods and Indus., Inc. v. Doliner, 26 A.D.2d 41, 43, 270
N.Y.S.2d 937, 940 (1966). See Whirlpool Corp. v. Regis Leasing Corp., 29 A.D.2d
395, 288 N.Y.S.2d 337 (1968). See generally J. WHrrFE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 15,
§ 2-10.
42. See, e.g., George v. Davoli, 91 Misc. 2d 296, 397 N.Y.S.2d 895 (Geneva City
Ct. 1977).
43. See J. MuRRAY, JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 106, at 231 (1974) (discussing

3A. CORBIN,

supra note

36, § 582).

[Vol. 27

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

Intent need not be determined by the document alone. 44 Even if
the writing contains a merger clause and a disclaimer, parol evidence
may be admitted to demonstrate that the writing is not final. 45 The
burden of proof may be heavy, but the parol evidence rule should not
exclude convincing evidence of an oral agreement that contradicts a
writing.46 A finding that a writing is not final could therefore "be
based solely on the fact of the existence of the prior oral warranty. ' 47
While such an argument may seem circular-parol warranties are introduced to show that the writing is not final, and then are reintroduced to prove a breach of contract-this result "seems to be intended
by the Code, or, at least, if not intended one that is left open to a
court to achieve. ' 48 Furthermore, the Code's policies favoring the survival of express warranties49 and limiting the operation of the parol
44. Professor Corbin has stated: "[T]he courts' assumption or decision as to the
completeness and accuracy of the integration may be quite erroneous. The writing cannot prove its own completeness or accuracy. Even though it contains an express statement to that effect, the assent of the parties thereto must still be proved." 3 A. CORBIN,
supra note 36, § 582 at 448-49 (footnotes omitted). See J. MURRAY, JR., supra note 43,
§ 106.
45. 3 A. CoaBIN, supra note 36, § 585 at 481. See, e.g., Lakeside Bridge & Steel
Co. v. Mountain State Constr. Co., 400 F. Supp. 273 (E.D. Wis. 1975) (" 'Parol evidence is always admissible with respect to the issue of integration .

. . .'

". Id. at 278

(quoting Johnson Hill's Press v. Nascon Indus., 33 Wis. 2d 545, 550, 148 N.W.2d 9, 12
(1967)); Shore Line Prop., Inc. v. Deer-O-Paints & Chem., Ltd., 24 Ariz. App. 331, 538
P.2d 760 (1975) ("The reference to the parol evidence rule [in section 2-316(1)] is
intended to protect the seller against allegations of oral warranties which are not part
of the contract. However, the protection afforded by [§ 2-202] is subject to a
significant restriction, that is, the court must first determine that the written agreement
of the parties is final, complete and exclusive." Id. at 334, 538 P.2d at 764) ; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 242, comment e at 52 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1971)
("a [merger] clause does not control the question whether the writing was assented to

as an integrated agreement . . . or the interpretation of the written terms." Id.).
46. 3 A. CORBIN, supra note 36, § 585 at 481.
47. R. DUESENBERG & L. KINO, supra note 39, § 6.06 at 6-14. See also A. CoRBIN,
supra note 36, § 582 at 450.
48. R. DUESENBERG & L. KING, supra note 39, § 6.06 at 6-14. The Code's sole
reference to the problem is in Official Comment 2 of § 2-316, which states in part:
"The seller is protected under this Article against false allegations of oral warranties by
its provisions on parol . . . evidence .

. . ."

N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-316, Official Comment 2

(McKinney 1964). The implication is that the introduction of true allegations of oral
warranties is permitted, Broude, supra note 39, at 918, though the Official Comment
does seem to place the risk of nonpersuasion squarely upon the party asserting the parol
warranties.
49. Special protection is extended to express warranties by the Code. Official Comment 1 to § 2-313 states in part: "'Express' warranties rest on 'dickered' aspects of
the individual bargain, and go so clearly to the essence of that bargain that words of
disclaimer in a form are repugnant to the basic dickered terms." N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-313,
Official Comment 1 (McKinney 1964). More generally, the Code adopts the policy "of
those cases which refuse to recognize a material deletion of the seller's obligation." N.Y.
U.C.C. § 2-316, Official Comment 1 (McKinney 1964).

1978]

UNCONSCIONABILITY

evidence rule support this result.50
A number of cases have permitted the introduction of parol warranties to prove lack of finality despite the inclusion of a disclaimer
in the written contract. 51 One illustrative case is O'Neil v. International Harvester Co.,5 2 where buyer-plaintiff appealed a summary judg-

ment for seller-defendant to the Colorado Court of Appeals. The defendant had allegedly represented that a used diesel tractor and trailer
"had been recently overhauled and would be suitable for operation
in the mountains."5 3 The plaintiff encountered many mechanical problems with the truck and, after several attempts at repair by the defendant, the buyer returned it. The bill of sale contained both a
merger clause and a disclaimer of all warranties. The court of appeals reversed and remanded: "Where .

.

. the buyer alleges the exist-

ence of oral warranties prior to execution of the written contract, as
50. Section 2-202 was intended to abolish the presumption that a writing is the
complete statement of the agreement. See Hunt Foods & Indus., Inc. v. Doliner, 49
Misc. 2d 246, 267 N.Y.S.2d 364 (Sup. Ct.), rev'd on other grounds, 26 A.D.2d 41,

270 N.Y.S.2d 937 (1966)

(§ 2-202 abolished presumption that a writing is a total inte-

gration and requires the court to find a total integration); 1955 N.Y. LAw RavIsioN
CoMiissIoN REPORT, STUDY OF THE UNIFORM COMTERCIAL CODE, at 598 ("The chief
purpose of this section is apparently to 'loosen up' the parol evidence rule by abolishing
the presumption that a writing (apparently complete) is a total integration . . . ." Id.).
51. See, e.g., A & A Discount Center, Inc. v. Sawyer, 27 N.C. App. 528, 219
S.E.2d 532 (1975); Drier v. Perfection, Inc., 259 N.W.2d 496 (So. Da. 1977); Town
& Country Mobil Home, Inc. v. Benfer, 527 S.W.2d 523 (Tex. Ct. App. 1975); Bowen
v. Young, 507 S.W.2d 600 (Tex. Ct. App. 1975); Mobile Housing, Inc. v. Stone, 490
S.W.2d 611 (Tex. Ct. App. 1973); Peter Pan Seafoods, Inc. v. Olympic Foundry Co.,
17 Wash. App. 761, 565 P.2d 819 (1977); Zwierzycki v. Owens, 499 P.2d 996 (Wyo.
1972); cf. Hertz Comm. Leasing Corp. v. Transportation Credit Clearing House, Inc.,
59 Misc. 2d 226, 298 N.Y.S.2d 392 (Civ. Ct. 1969), rev'd on other grounds, 64 Misc.
2d 910, 316 N.Y.S.2d 585 (App. T. 1970) (as disclaimer of express and implied warranties not specifically bargained for, disclaimer invalid); Eckstein v. Cummins, 41 Ohio
App. 2d 1, 321 N.E.2d 897, 905 (1974) (requirement of good faith precluded conclusion that warranty disclaimer which limited buyer's remedies to repair or replacement of
defective parts was intended by the buyer to be the final expression of the agreement) ;
Berg v. Stromme, 79 Wash. 2d 184, 484 P.2d 380 (1971) (a waiver of implied warranties must be explicitly negotiated). But see Avery v. Aladdin Prods.- Div., Nat'l Serv.
Indus., Inc., 128 Ga. App. 266, 196 S.E.2d 357 (1973); Jordan v. Doonan Truck &
Equip., Inc., 220 Kan. 431, 552 P.2d 881 (1976); Fablok Mills, Inc. v. Cocker Machine
& Foundry Co., 125 N.J. Super. 251, 310 A.2d 491 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1973);
F.M.C. Corp. v. Seal Tape Ltd., 90 Misc. 2d 1043, 396 N.Y.S.2d 993 (Sup. Ct.
1977): Pennsylvania Gas Co. v. Secord Bros., 73 Misc. 2d 1031, 343 N.Y.S.2d 256 (Sup.
Ct. 1973), aff'd, 44 A.D.2d 906, 357 N.Y.S.2d 707 (1974); Bakal v. Burroughs Corp.,
74 Misc. 2d 202, 343 N.Y.S.2d 541 (Sup. Ct. 1972); Will Laboratories, Inc. v. White
Rock Pen Corp., 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 848 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1967). See also Broude,
supra note 39, at 917. Professor Broude asserts that in contracts involving consumer
purchasers, the seller, in order to be protected, has an affirmative duty to put the
consumer on actual notice of a disclaimer of warranties.
52. 575 P.2d 862 (Co. Ct. App. 1978).
53. Id. at 864.
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which tends to show that warwell as conduct following the sale
ranties were in fact made, there is a material issue of fact for resolution." 54 No published opinion in New York, however, has explicitly
adopted the above reasoning.55 One reason may be that courts often
hear evidence on the issue of finality, but reject it for lack of credibility, and thus no reference is made to the evidence in the opinion.50
Several factors suggest the parties in Industralease did not intend
the writing to supersede all prior oral agreements. First, Industralease
expended much effort in trying to get the incinerators to work. There
was "a daily shuttle" between the manufacturer's factory and the picnic grove; 57 Clean Air and Industralease were "desperately trying" to
start the incinerators. 8 Like the parties in O'Neil, the parties here
thought the incinerators were covered by warranty. Since oral representations had been made, and the actions of the parties suggest they
believed the warranties still to be binding, the disclaimer in the writing was arguably not intended to supersede those prior oral representations. Furthermore, the first contract signed provided Evans with a
warranty that in effect integrated the oral representations. Despite the
later disclaimer, nothing in the conduct or the statements of the parties suggest they intended to shift the risk of a defective incinerator
to Evans. Rather, the parties believed the second contract to be substantially the same as the first, especially in light of Evans' belief that
the second writing was "like" the first.59 There is thus no evidence,
other than Evans' signature at the end of a hastily signed document,
to indicate that both parties intended the second writing to supersede
their earlier agreement regarding the risk of a defective incinerator.
The court could also have admitted the parol warranties using
the doctrine of mistake. Under section 1-103, "principles of law and
equity" may supplement the provisions of the Code.00 Where fraud,
illegality, accident, or mistake is averred, therefore, parol evidence is
admissible. 0 '
54. Id. at 865.
55. See note 50 supra.
56. See 3 A. CORBIN, supra note 36, § 585 at 482-85; see, e.g., Jordan v. Doonan
Truck & Equip., Inc., 220 Kan. 431, 552 P.2d 881 (1976).
57. 58 A.D.2d at 484 n.3, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 428 n.3.
58. Id. at 485 n. 3 , 396 N.Y.S.2d at 429 n.3.
59. Reply Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant at 2; Defendants-Respondents' Brief at 2;
Defendants-Respondents' Supplemental Brief at 4.
60. N.Y. U.C.C. § 1-103 (McKinney 1964).
61. See, e.g., Associated Hardware Supply Co. v. Big Wheel Distrib. Co., 355
F.2d 114 (3d Cir. 1966) (applying Pennsylvania law); Braund, Inc. v. White, 486
P.2d 50 (Alas. 1971). See generally 3 A. CORBIN, supra note 36, §§ 578, 580, 585 &
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There are three elements to a unilateral mistake argument: first,
the person signing or accepting the document must be unaware of its
contents; second, the other party must have reason to know of the
signer's mistake; and third, the other party must not have "materially
changed his position in reliance on the written provision. 0' 2 Evans did
not read the second contract; "it was impossible to read the papers before signing them."6' 3 The first contract, between Enterprises and
Glean Air, was "no good"; 64 but, the new contract was "like" the old
one.6 5 These misrepresentations, combined with the pressure Evans
was under to close a deal for incinerators before the start of the new
business season, may have provided a basis for concluding that Industralease knew Evans would be mistaken about the terms of the contract. Furthermore, Industralease did not materially change its position in reliance on the disclaimer so as to prevent recovery by Enterprises for the breach of warranties.
Justice Hopkins' analysis exposes an ever present problem with
unconscionability doctrine-unpredicability. Section 2-302 was enacted to avoid the covert manipulation of contract law to achieve a
desired result. 6 It was intended to increase the predictability of the
law; since unconscionability was left undefined, predictability is dependent on the courts' articulation of factors relevant to an unconscionability determination.67 By relying on hindsight to find substantive unconscionability, the Industralease court introduced a specious
element into the doctrine. After the fact examinations of contracts cut
against the policy of stability in commercial agreements; legitimately
bargained for terms should not be overturned by the courts. Coupled
with its finding of procedural unconscionability in a commercial situation between two parties of relatively equal bargaining power, the
court's holding is questionable. The preferred analysis would evaluate
the applicability of the parol evidence rule and the common law doctrine of mistake--doctrines more closely attuned to the correct point
in time, the transformation of the oral agreement into a writing. In607; Annot., 71 A.L.R.3d 1059 (1976); Broude, supra note 39; Sweet, Promissory
Fraud and the Parol Evidence Rule, 49 CAL. L. Rpv. 877 (1961). Industralease is open

to both a fraud and mistake argument, though only mistake is discussed here.
62. 3 A. CORBIN, supra note 36, § 607 at 658-59, 664-65.
63. Defendants-Respondents' Brief at 2.
64. 58 A.D.2d at 484, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 428.
65. Reply Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 2; Defendants-Respondents' Brief at 2;
Defendants-Respondents' Supplemental Brief at 4.
66. N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-302, Official Comment 1 (McKinney 1964).
67. See Spanogle, supra note 10, at 936.
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stead of slipping into the quagmire of unconscionability with its
loosely defined borders and susceptibility to misuse, the court should
have applied traditional contract doctrines that provide well reasoned
results.
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